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Observers have noted that the election results in Peninsular Malaysia indicate the 
major swing of the ethnic votes to the opposition. This is shown by the fact that the 
Malay-Muslim voters have turned their support from UMNO (United Malays 
National Organisation) to PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) or PAS (Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia). The same goes to the ethnic Chinese and Indians who have swung their 
votes to DAP (Democratic Action Party) or PKR, resulting in MCA (Malaysian 
Chinese Association) and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) to lose badly in the 
elections. But the scenario is totally different in Sabah where the majority ethnic 
group the Kadazandusun have maintained their support to the BN despite the 
opposition’s claim that it has won the Kadazandusun votes just before the election. 
For some, this is indeed surprising as the Kadazandusun are formerly known as 
strong opposition supporters through the Kadazandusun-based PBS (Parti Bersatu 
Sabah). This article explains why the Kadazandusun maintain their support to the 
BN (Barisan Nasional) and why the opposition has failed to win their votes.  
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Para pemerhati sependapat bahawa pilihan raya di Semenanjung Malaysia 
menunjukkan arah pengundian yang lebih berpihak kepada parti pembangkang. Ini 
berasaskan fakta yang pengundi Melayu beragama Islam merubah undi mereka 
dari UMNO kepada PKR atau PAS . Perkara yang sama berlaku dalam kelompok 
pengundi etnik Cina dan India yang mengundi DAP atau PKR dan menyebabkan 
MCA mengalami kekalahan teruk dalam pilihan raya ini. Walau bagaimanapun 
senario politik berbeza di Sabah yang kumpulan etnik majoriti Kadazandusun, 
telah mengekalkan sokongan mereka kepada BN walaupun pembangkang 
mendakwa telah menguasai kumpulan etnik ini. Keadaan ini mengejutkan kerana 
selama ini Kadazandusun kuat menyokong parti pembangkang seperti ditunjukkan 
dalam parti PBS. Artikel ini menjelaskan mengapa Kadazandusun menyokong BN 
dan mengapa pembangkang gagal mendapatkan undi daripada  mereka. 
 
Katakunci: Kadazandusun (KD), Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Huguan Siou. 
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Introduction  
 
Malaysia is known for its multi-racial and multi-religious society. Through the different 
phases of Malaysian political history, political parties have evolved over time along 
ethnic and religious considerations (Brown 2005). It is observed that political parties in 
Malaysia have survived due to their success in playing up ethnic related issues. This is 
obvious in Peninsular Malaysia where the three ethnically based political parties namely 
UMNO, MCA and MIC have continuously over the years tried to win the support of their 
respective communities. In Sabah and Sarawak, the pattern of political party arrangement 
is almost identical to that of Peninsular Malaysia.  
 In Sabah, the role of ethnicity (indigenous versus non-indigenous) in a semi-
competitive political party system is not as strong as in Peninsular Malaysia where the 
competition between the indigenous and non-indigenous political parties is obvious. The 
competition between political parties in Sabah normally falls not along ethnic lines but 
along the interests of the different individual political party leaders, both at inter and intra 
levels. Though the political conflict between the different ethnic groups in Sabah has 
never been as clear-cut as in Peninsular Malaysia, ethnic politics has always been a 
salient factor. Ethnic politics can be understood simply as the contests for and 
manipulations of political power along ethnic lines by a group of political actors and 
political parties (Horowitz 2000; Andersen and Heath 2000).   
 The 2008 general elections show yet once again how the survival of political 
parties in Malaysia is depended upon the support of the particular ethnic groups except 
that in some cases ethnic voting is no longer as decisive. The election results in 
Peninsular Malaysia is particularly surprising because the largest ethnic group there, the 
Malays, had begun to look beyond UMNO and had shifted their support to the multiracial 
PKR (ASLI 2008). The same goes to the Chinese and Indians who also shifted their 
support to either PKR or DAP. It was found out that the popular votes obtained by 
UMNO were just 35.5 per cent compared to PAS/PKR combined 34.8 per cent (ASLI 
2008).  
 The UMNO even lost in urban and semi-urban Malay seats such as Titiwangsa 
and Lembah Pantai (in Kuala Lumpur), Shah Alam, Hulu Langat, Kuala Langat, Kuala 
Selangor, Gombak, Ampang, Sungai Petani, Merbok, Kulim, Nibong Tebal, Balik Pulau 
(in Penang), Parit Buntar and Bagan Serai in Perak (ASLI 2008). The MCA and MIC 
were almost wiped out when the Chinese and Indians voted for either DAP or PKR. The 
DAP’s propaganda that a vote for MCA and GERAKAN would mean a vote for UMNO 
proved to be successful in turning away the Chinese voters from voting the Chinese BN 
parties.    
 In Sabah, the situation is almost the same as in Peninsular Malaysia except that 
the largest ethnic group, the Kadazandusun (or KD as they will be referred to throughout 
this article), chose not to vote for the opposition led by PKR despite their past experience 
as strong supporters to the then opposition PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah). Despite the 
perceived “protest votes” emanating from the Chinese and Indian voters who were not 
satisfied with the way the prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi handled certain ethnic 
related issues, the KD voters were not unduly perturbed and gave their votes to the BN. 
The article explains why the KD maintain their support to the BN and why the opposition 
has failed to win them over. It argues that the KD voting pattern cannot be explained 
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simply within the context of the present political situation as their past political 
experiences and cultural background are also important in order to explain their voting 
behaviour.  
 
Kadazandusun Political Change 
 
The KD has been represented by numerous political parties since the formation of 
Malaysia in 1963. According to Yearbook of Statistics Sabah (2004), the KD make up 
about 17.97 per cent of the total population in Sabah, making them the biggest ethnic 
group (Table 1). But politically, the KD has not been able to exert any political control 
except from 1985 to 1994 under the PBS. But PBS could not be said to be a 
predominantly KD party when it was formed in 1985 as though the large bulk of its 
membership composition comprised urban and rural KD, the Muslim and Chinese 
presence in the party then was significantly strong. But as time passed by and the 
Malaysian politics changed, the PBS’s multiracial outlook had gradually eroded partly 
because of its failure to maintain its Chinese and Muslim support and the BN’s action in 
imposing a Peninsular political dichotomy in Sabah.    
 
Table 1: Mid-Year Population Estimates By Ethnic Group, Sabah (2004) 
 
Ethnic Group 
 
Number Percentage 
Malaysian Citizens 
 
  
Malay 330,600 11.55 
Kadazandusun 514,400 17.97 
Bajau 381,500 13.32 
Murut    94,000   3.28 
Other Bumiputera 421,700 14.73 
Chinese 277,300   9.68 
Others 
 
138,000   4.82 
Sub-Total 
  
2,157,500 75.38 
Non-Malaysian Citizens    704,800 24.62 
 
Total Population   2,862,300 100 
Source: Yearbook of Statistics Sabah (2004) 
 
The first party which represented the KD in Sabah was UNKO (United National Kadazan 
Organisation) led by the first KD Huguan Siou (Paramount Leader), Donald Stephens. 
The UNKO later merged with the rural-based Pasok Momugun to form UPKO (United 
Pasok Momugun Kadazan Organisation). The UPKO since became a formidable force for 
the KD to exert their political influence. The UPKO together with the Muslim-based 
USNO (United Sabah National Organisation), the Chinese-based SCA (Sabah Chinese 
Association) and SIC (Sabah Indian Congress) formed a coalition the Sabah Alliance and 
became the first government to rule Sabah after the formation of Malaysia in 1963 
(Luping 1994; Ongkili 1989: 61-79 & 1967). The Sabah Alliance’s rule, however, was 
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short-lived after the fallout between Stephens and USNO’s founder Mustapha Harun. The 
UPKO was pushed into the political periphery for a certain period of time until Stephens 
made a plea for the KD members of UPKO to dissolve the party to join USNO for the 
sake of unity1
 Sabah politics has since been controlled by UMNO which entered into Sabah, 
again with strong federal influence in 1991 (Chin 1994: 904-915; Chin 1999: 20-40; 
Mohd Agus  2006 and Ross-Larson 1977). This federal influence is marked by the 
Federal Government’s “repressive-responsive” attitude towards Sabah (Crouch 1996). An 
example of its repressive attitude is when several PBS leaders were arrested under 
questionable circumstances at the height of the federal-state conflict from 1991-1994 
(Mohd Agus 2006 and Chin 1997: 96-120). The Federal Government’s responsive 
.  
 
Following Mustapha’s fallout with the Federal Government, the KD political 
fortune took a different turn again. Stephens saw the opportunity to team up with 
the Federal Government under the then prime minister Abdul Razak to topple the 
USNO Government. With Abduk Razak’s endorsement, a new party BERJAYA 
(Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah) was formed and Stephens was entrusted to lead it 
(Han 1979: 379-389). The KD shifted their support en masse to BERJAYA and they 
saw this opportunity to come into power again after years of being marginalised by 
the Mustapha regime. However, the KD’s hope was dashed after Stephens’s sudden 
demise in an aircrash off Sembulan in 1976. A Muslim, Harris Salleh took over 
from Stephens as president of BERJAYA and Sabah’s chief minister. 
 
 The more pro-federal Salleh undertook a number of policies which were 
unacceptable to the KD. The KD thought that Harris was out to destroy their cultural 
significance. Being a strong “federal man” (as many in Sabah have called him), Harris 
was determined to project a more “Malay outlook” of the Sabah Government after being 
pressurized by the Federal Government to do so. The KD was obviously unhappy. Joseph 
Pairin Kitingan, a young KD leader in Harris’s cabinet, rose to challenge the latter 
resulting in the former being sacked from BERJAYA. The battle between the two leaders 
continued when a by-election was announced in Pairin’s stronghold in Tambunan. Harris 
suffered his first major setback when the BERJAYA candidate lost in Tambunan to 
Pairin. Pairin’s popularity grew and Harris became more determined to end Pairin’s 
political career as quickly as the latter’s influence had grown tremendously among the 
grassroots.  
 Harris called for a snap election in 1985 so as to ensure the new party formed by 
Pairin, PBS, did not have the means to expand its grassroots support. The PBS, however, 
won the election. The KD clearly threw their support to PBS, owing much to Pairin’s 
status as the new emerging champion of the KD. Pairin became the chief minister and the 
KD were returned into their former glory. The PBS renewed its outstanding electoral 
performance in the 1986 elections during which the BERJAYA was ousted. PBS ruled 
Sabah until 1994 when rampant crossovers caused its downfall (Chin 1994: 904-915). 
The PBS became the main opposition party in Sabah until it was re-admitted into the BN 
in 2002.  
                                               
1 It is clear, from the stand point of some observers, that Stephens’s action to join USNO was politically 
motivated (Luping 1994)  
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attitude can be seen in the context of its action in responding to the wishes of the Sabahan 
people such as the introduction of the two-year rotation system of the chief minister post.   
Chin (1999: 20-40), however, suggests that the repressive-responsive thesis “is 
only partly applicable to Sabah” because what the Federal Government really wants to 
see is a direct electoral competition between the Muslim and non-Muslim electorate. 
When UMNO came to Sabah, it imposed “the peninsular political dichotomy of 
Malay/non-Malay Bumiputera/non-Bumiputera Muslim/non-Muslim Bumiputera, over 
the existing triangular situation (Muslim Bumiputera, non-Muslim Bumiputera, Chinese) 
in Sabah politics” (Chin 1999: 40). This is particularly true as Sabah has seen its electoral 
boundaries deliberately changed so many times to increase the Muslim’s (and UMNO’s) 
electoral power. 
 Prior to the 2008 elections, the political configurations in Sabah clearly showed 
that UMNO was holding the real power. It controlled 32 seats in the state legislative 
assembly followed by PBS 13, UPKO five, SAPP (Sabah People’s Progressive Party) 
four, LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) three, MCA one, PBRS (Parti Bersatu Rakyat 
Sabah) one and Independent one. The deliberate changes also known as gerrymandering 
made in the electoral map have partially ensured UMNO’s political dominance (Jomo 
1996: 90-113 and Loh 2003: 228-252). For instance in 2004, several new seats were 
introduced to the advantage of UMNO in the mainly Malay-Muslim areas.2
 The KD community wanted a strong opposition voice in the state assembly as 
they thought this is necessary to ensure the Sabah UMNO does not abuse its powers. But 
the inability of PBS and other KD-based parties to assume the role made the KD people 
anxious and they were serious in wanting to change the government. Due to the strong 
 The changes 
had increased UMNO’s seats from 22 in 1999 to 32 in 2004. The second biggest party in 
the state assembly, PBS, appeared to be affected by the changes when the Pensiangan and 
Sembulan seats it won in 1999 were dropped from the electoral map. The changes also 
reduced PBS’s influence in Muslim areas while at the same time re-affirmed its control in 
KD areas.  
     
Pre Election Scenario 
 
During campaigning, an opposition candidate related how the KD community had shown 
their displeasure towards BN in Sabah (Jurin W. Gunsalam 2008, pers. comm., March 10, 
2008). They were said to be dissatisfied by the way the KD-based parties perform in the 
UMNO-dominated state assembly. A number of issues closely related to the KD such as 
poverty in rural areas and NCR (Native Customary Rights) land had not been addressed 
properly by the KD leaders.  In a random interview conducted by a local newspaper, it 
was found out that a substantial number of voters in the predominantly KD area of 
Tenom wanted a change in the state administration. They said they wanted the BN leader 
representing their area be changed as he failed to bring much development. They also 
said they had nothing to lose if they vote for the opposition as many of the promises 
made by the BN during the 2004 general elections remained unfulfilled (Daily Express, 
February 17, 2008). 
                                               
2 The new seats were Karambunai, Membakut, Gum-Gum, Tungku, Bugaya, Apas, and Sebatik. 
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sentiments on the ground, the opposition was confident that it could win the votes of the 
KD voters.   
 The maverick KD leader, Jeffrey Kitingan led the campaign to bring a new lease 
of life to opposition politics in Sabah. He launched his political comeback in a truly 
dramatic fashion in Tambunan during which the Tambunan Declaration was announced. 
The Declaration, among other things, sought to return the rights of Sabahans such as the 
right to more oil royalty, greater representation in the federal cabinet and civil service, the 
return of the Federal Territory of Labuan to Sabah, and the appointment of a second 
deputy prime minister from Sabah should the PKR win the election (The Star, February 
27, 2008). For some, Jeffrey’s decision to choose Tambunan is because he wanted to 
imitate Pairin’s rise in 1985 after Tambunan was abrogated from its district status by the 
BERJAYA Government.  
 The incidence in Tambunan paved the way for Pairin to form PBS which later 
took control of Sabah politics until its downfall in 1994. Jeffrey chose PKR as his new 
party platform because he said the party is sympathetic to the Sabah problems and that he 
is willing to help Sabah PKR realizes its political aspiration. Some KD were convinced of 
Jeffrey’s political struggles despite people calling him “katak” (political frog) for his 
penchant of hopping from one political party to another (Chin 1999). His election records 
speak volumes of his substantial influence among the KD people. 
 Much of the campaign launched by Jeffrey revolved around the alleged economic 
monopoly and malpractices of the Musa administration (Welsh 2008). More than 80 
police reports were lodged by Jeffrey, alleging Musa’s misuse of power as Sabah’s chief 
minister (Malaysia Today 2008). Despite the presence of PKR and internal political 
squabble within the state BN ranks, the BN was set to win without any major challenge 
because it appeared that the BN KD based parties were still popular among the KD 
people. The opposition appeared to be at loggerheads over seats allocation. For instance, 
the names submitted by Jeffrey was said to be overtaken by those submitted by Sabah 
PKR liaison chief Ansari Abdullah. This resulted in Jeffrey’s supporters contesting as 
independents. The election saw 807,862 eligible voters of which 13,414 or about 1.7 per 
cent was postal voters.   
 
Candidates and Parties  
 
The BN applied almost the same formula as in 2004, contesting in 25 parliamentary and 
60 state seats. The BN KD parties in Sabah consisted of PBS, UPKO and PBRS. PBS and 
UPKO were allocated two seats respectively while UMNO and PBRS one seat each. At 
the parliamentary level, the BN contested in all six KD seats namely Kota Marudu, 
Penampang, Ranau, Keningau, Tenom and Pensiangan.  
 But on the eve of nomination day, the Pensiangan seat was won by the BN when 
the PKR candidate was disqualified for “technical reason”. All eyes were directed at 
Penampang which saw the return of Bernard Dompok to contest the seat. The other hot 
seat was in Keningau which saw Pairin being challenged by his own brother Jeffrey. The 
opposition chose to contest in all parliamentary seats but the high number of independent 
candidates contesting in the same seats reduced the chances for the opposition to deny the 
BN a huge majority win.   
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 At the state level, the PBS was allocated seven KD seats, followed by UPKO four 
seats and UMNO and PBRS one each. The PBS contested in Matunggong, Tandek, 
Kadamaian, Tamparuli, Kiulu, Kundasang and Tambunan while UPKO in Moyog, 
Paginatan, Bingkor and Nabawan. UMNO contested in Kemabong while PBRS in Sook.  
 There was also this issue of the PBS reneging on its promise to retain all of the 
party’s 13 state and four parliamentary incumbents. Pairin said he decided to retain the 
incumbents as he did not want to “rock the boat” (Daily Express, February 22, 2008). 
However, at the eleventh hour during nomination, Pairin made a surprise move by 
dropping the incumbent for Matunggong Jornah Mozihim despite offering her an 
appointment letter to contest earlier. Pairin was believed to have been advised by his 
deputy Maximus not to field Jornah as her supporters in Matunggong had supported the 
then independent candidate in the 2004 general election.  
 In the battle to wrest the parliamentary seat of Kota Marudu which consisted of 
Matunggong and Tandek, the independent candidate Anthony Mandiau managed to 
collect well more than 7000 votes believed to be mainly from Matunggong. Many see 
Maximus’ action as an attempt to “punish” Jornah for failing to deliver the votes from 
Matunggong (Daily Express, March 7, 2008). The number of independent candidates 
increased to 18 from 13 in 2004 at the parliamentary level while at the state level, a total 
of 57 candidates contested.  
 
Campaign and Issues 
 
Before we examine the election issues in the KD areas, it is important to see the issues at 
national level. Like during the previous elections, the BN was banking on the 
development rhetoric in its campaigns by bringing forward the slogan of “Peace, Safe and 
Progress”. The BN’s campaign boasted the achievements of the Abdullah administration 
in the last four years. These included the high economic growth as reflected in the growth 
of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of 8 per cent from RM427 million to RM504 billion.   
 In Sabah, the people were reminded of the government’s seriousness in 
developing the state through the establishment of Sabah Development Corridor (SDC)  
which promised to provide 900,000 jobs, involving an investment of RM105 billion in 
the next 18 years. The BN also presented a progress report of the State BN from 2004-
2007 (Daily Express, February 27, 2008 and The Borneo Post, March 7, 2008). 
  The same old tactic of providing on-the-spot grants was also employed by the BN 
(Puyok 2007: 64-79). During Musa’s visit to the interior area of Sipitang, he officiated 
the launching of the new cultural centre of the Lundayeh community. He even gave 
RM100, 000 to the Sabah Lundayeh Cultural Association3
Another instance was in Kota Marudu where the PBS incumbent Maximus 
Ongkili gave RM250 each to 93 pupils of Sekolah Kebangsaan Mangaris through the 
Education Ministry’s Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pelajar Termiskin (KWAPM or Poor 
Students Trust Group) (The Borneo Post, March 7, 2008). Even though Maximus refuted 
. Some in the community 
charged that this is clearly an attempt to win the votes of the Lundayeh people who have 
been long known as strong supporters to the opposition (anonymous, pers. comm., June 
13, 2008).  
                                               
3 The figure has been confirmed by an insider who attended the function.  
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the opposition’s claim that the fund was used as a campaign tool, a source claimed that 
the fund had been misused by the former for political expediency (anonymous, pers. 
comm., March 10, 2008). It appeared that the fund was also distributed in Nabawan by 
Keningau UMNO chief Abdul Ghani Mohd Yassin, involving 233 and 188 pupils 
respectively in two schools—Sekolah Kebangsaan Kampung Bahagia and Sekolah 
Kebangsaan Binakan in Sook (Daily Express, March 7, 2008).  
 Nationally, the DAP campaigned along the tagline “Just Change It” in which it 
promised to give a bonus of up to RM6000 per family for households earning RM6000 or 
less per annum. The money spent on the bonus would be taken from Petronas’ profit of 
RM70 billion. The DAP also promised to ensure adequate water supply and a provision 
to mobilize 100,000 police personnel to patrol the streets to reduce the number of rising 
criminal cases.  
The PKR’s manifesto, “A New Dawn for Malaysia”, aimed “to end race-based 
discrimination policies, lower fuel prices and fight corruption” (The Borneo Post, 
February 27, 2009). In Sabah, the PKR and DAP took the BN to task by claiming that 
under the BN, the people’s NCR lands are completely wiped out after the BN amended 
the Sabah Land Ordinance (Daily Express, March 7, 2008). The DAP went on by saying 
that “land-grabbing” in Sabah was at its worst” (Daily Express, February 27, 2008). The 
PKR promised to preserve the natives’ rights while the DAP vowed to return the NCR 
lands to the people who have been occupying them for generations (Daily Express, 
February 27, 2008).     
 In KD areas, the opposition played out the “Wind of Change” slogan, asking the 
voters to “tukaron bangkad” (change the shirt-- meaning to change their support from BN 
to the opposition). This was particularly evident in rural areas such as in Keningau (Daily 
Express, March 2, 2008). The opposition also questioned Pairin’s effectiveness in voicing 
out the people’s problems. In one instance, the PKR claimed that Pairin was no longer 
needed by the KD community (Daily Express, March 7, 2008). The opposition believed 
that the KD was not happy with the BN and especially PBS whom they have long 
supported since the party’s inception in 1985.  
 For some, the PBS’s role as “champion” of the KD people was no longer felt as 
Pairin was considered as a “BN man” who is now singing a different tune (Welsh 2008a). 
Jeffry, who was challenging Pairin in Keningau even went to the offensive by saying that 
it is time for Pairin to quit as “he is now sounding more like the UMNO leaders when he 
is telling his own people that the development will stop if they do not vote for BN”. The 
message that the opposition was trying to convey was that it is time for Pairin to 
concentrate on his role as the cultural leader of the KD in his capacity as Huguan Siou 
and president of KDCA.  
 It appeared that the PBS was trying to avoid campaigning along the issues of state 
and KD rights. It preferred to remind the KD of the sufferings experienced by them when 
the PBS was in the opposition. The PBS pleaded the KD voters to return the BN to power 
as it had brought about many developments in Sabah. The UPKO brought the same 
message of continuity and development. But compared to PBS, the UPKO made it clear 
that it is the only KD party in Sabah that is capable of looking after the affairs of the KD 
people. Of all the KD-based parties, the UPKO’s KD sentiment is the most explicit.     
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Analysing the Voting Pattern  
 
At the national level, the BN suffered a major setback after failing to retain its two-thirds 
majority win. It only obtained 49 per cent of the popular votes cast compared to the 
opposition 51 per cent (ASLI 2008 and Welsh 2008b). Of all the 140 seats the BN won, 
54 came from Sabah and Sarawak. So without the contribution of Sabah and Sarawak, the 
BN would not have obtained a simple majority. The opposition also managed to increase 
its seats in the parliament from 12 previously to 82 this time around. The BN, however, 
won impressively in Sabah and Sarawak. Of all the 25 parliamentary and 60 state seats 
contested in Sabah, the BN won 24 and 59 respectively. In Sarawak, the opposition was 
clearly decimated where it only won one seat in its stronghold in Bandar Kuching 
compared to the BN 30 seats.  
 The BN won all the six parliamentary seats in KD areas including in Pensiangan 
where it was won uncontested by Joseph Kurup of PBRS. In terms of popular votes, the 
BN obtained 58.68 per cent compared to the combined opposition votes 36.40 per cent. 
Both the BN and opposition had their share of popular votes dropped by 1.2 and 3.71 per 
cent respectively (Table 2). In 2004, the BN obtained 59.88 per cent while the opposition 
and independents combined obtained 40.11 per cent. The BN component parties of PBS 
and UPKO shared the number of popular votes at 24.55 per cent and 25.33 per cent 
respectively while UMNO only 8.79 per cent. The large bulk of the opposition votes went 
to PKR (35.02 per cent), followed by BERSEKUTU (0.86 per cent) and DAP (0.51 per 
cent). The remaining 4.91 per cent went to the independent candidates.  
 
Table 2: Share of the Popular Votes According to Constituency Type at the Parliamentary 
Level 
 
Constituency type 
(parliament) 
Popular vote (%) Difference 
BN Opposition 
 
Kadazandusun 
(non-Muslim 
Bumiputera) 
 
Chinese  
 
Malay/Muslim 
(Muslim Bumiputera) 
 
Mixed 
 
 
58.68  (59.88)* 
 
 
 
35.62 (56.32) 
 
66.06 (69.55) 
 
 
62.14 (70.63) 
 
36.40 (40.11) 
 
 
 
57.41 (43.65) 
 
27.25 (30.41) 
 
 
36.27 (29.35) 
 
-1.2/-3.71 
 
 
 
-20.7/13.76 
 
-3.49/-3.16 
 
 
-8.49/6.92 
Note: * The figures in bracket represent the popular votes obtained in 2004 
Source: various newspaper reports in Daily Express and The Borneo Post as well as 
reports from the Malaysian Election Commission 
(http://semak.spr.gov.my/spr/laporan/5_KeputusanKeseluruhan.php. Retrieved on June 
12, 2008) 
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Table 3: Share of the Popular Votes According to Constituency Type at the State Level 
 
Constituency type 
(parliament) 
Popular vote (%) Difference 
BN Opposition 
 
Kadazandusun 
(non-Muslim 
Bumiputera) 
Chinese  
Malay/Muslim 
(Muslim Bumiputera) 
Mixed 
 
59.81 (59.88)* 
 
 
53 (68.91) 
68.78 (66.26) 
 
51.24 (70.63) 
 
 
34.56 (40.11) 
 
 
49.99 (31.08) 
27.58 (33.73) 
 
40.69 (n.a.) 
 
 
-0.07/-.5.55 
 
 
-15.91/18.91 
2.52/-6.15 
 
-19.39/n.a. 
Note: * The figures in bracket represent the popular votes obtained in 2004 
Source: various newspaper reports in Daily Express and The Borneo Post as well as 
reports from the Malaysian Election Commission 
(http://semak.spr.gov.my/spr/laporan/5_KeputusanKeseluruhan.php. Retrieved on June 
12, 2008) 
 
At the state level, the BN won all the 13 KD seats, collecting about 59.81 per cent 
of the popular votes compared to the opposition combined, 34.56 per cent (Table 3). In 
2004, the BN obtained 57.88 per cent of the popular votes while the opposition 42.09 per 
cent. At the individual party level, the PKR managed to collect about 33.59 per cent 
compared to the PBS 32.91 per cent. The share of the votes obtained by UPKO and 
PBRS is just 17.54 per cent and 4.82 per cent respectively.  
 Interestingly, the opposition could have denied the BN a huge majority in a 
number of areas had it been successful in persuading the independent candidates not to 
contest.  For example in Tandek, the combined votes of the PKR candidate with that of 
the independent’s and BERSEKUTU’s could have reduced the BN’s majority to just 
2454
 This could be attributed to two reasons. First, many saw PBS as gradually losing 
its image as “champion” to the KD and state rights. They might want an opposition voice 
in the state assembly which the PBS failed to provide. Second, Pairin’s silence on a 
number of pressing local issues such as fake ICs and illegal immigrants since becoming a 
“BN man” (as the opposition called him) has slightly affected his reputation as Huguan 
Siou (Paramount Leader). Jeffrey’s scathing attack on Pairin’s character as well as his 
. In Bingkor, Jeffrey could have won the seat had the independent chosen not to 
contest. The BN’s majority in Bingkor is only 122. In 2004, Jeffrey was almost able to 
wrest the seat from Kurup with a 143-vote difference.   
 The results show that the KD voters did not totally reject the opposition’s brand of 
politics which some quarters say as irrelevant to local people. But one cannot deny the 
fact that the KD voters want local-based parties such as PBS and UPKO to represent 
them at the federal level. At the state level, the opposition performed slightly better on an 
individual party basis, looking at the number of popular votes it obtained (33.59 per cent) 
compared to the major BN KD-based party, PBS, 32.01 per cent.  
                                               
4 The PKR candidate in Tandek said that among the reasons for his defeat were lack of finance to fund his 
campaign activities and short campaigning period (Jurin Gunsalam 2008, pers. comm., March 18) 
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revelation of Musa’s alleged corrupt practices might contribute to the swing of the KD 
votes. 
 The KD voters who remained loyal to PBS were those who were sympathetic to 
PBS’s struggles. They were adamant to vote for the opposition as they thought the PBS 
could fight for their rights effectively using the BN as a platform. They also had no 
choice but to support PBS and other BN KD parties because the PKR is an outsider party 
that does not understand fully the dynamics of local politics.      
 All the BN KD parties campaigned along the issues of development and 
continuity. The PBS chose to depart from its strong KD outlook while UPKO emerged to 
“new” champion to the KD community. The UPKO vowed to fight for the KD rights as it 
is the only “pure” KD party in the state. It even stated that it had “[stuck] its neck out” in 
speaking about the KD problems. The PBS, long associated with the KD, chose to “play 
it safe” as it has painful experience being in the opposition until it was re-admitted into 
BN in 2002. The PBRS’s electoral strength particularly at the parliamentary level is 
generally untested because it won the Pensiangan seat uncontested.  
 Despite the win, the PBRS president Joseph Kurup would have to face a lot of 
uncertainties ahead as there is a strong possibility that a by-election would be called in 
Pensiangan5
                                               
5The opposition candidate who had been disqualified to contest in Pensiangan due to “technical reason” 
filed an election petition, challenging Kurup’s victory. He also claimed that his disqualification was the act 
of sabotage. When the result was announced by the EC officer, Kurup had to be whisked away from the 
nomination centre to avoid from being hurt by the angry crowd (Daily Express, February 26, 2008).  
 
 
. Unlike in Pairin’s and Dompok’s case, Kurup had to choose the “hard way” 
to remain in power, that is, not to re-nominate the popular incumbent in Pensiangan 
Bernard Maraat whom he saw as the type of leader “who likes to work alone”. At one 
time, Maraat vowed to contest as an independent but only to change his mind later. To 
say which among the KD-based parties that is more popular among the KD voters 
warrant another close observation but PBS has the advantage because many KD still 
regard Pairin as a symbol of unity and strength due to his role as Huguan Siou and 
president of the Kadazandusun Cultural Association (KDCA) (Luping 1984: 83-87).  
 
Failure of the Tambunan Declaration? 
 
For some KD, there is much hope for them when Jeffrey launched the Tambunan 
Declaration which later became part of the Sabah PKR campaign manifesto under the 
theme “Justice for Sabahans”. The launching, they thought, would give them the 
opportunity to once again come into the political limelight they once had during Donald 
Stephens’ and Pairin’s times. But it would appear that a major portion of the KD people 
was not convinced with Jeffrey who chose PKR as his new political platform. For this 
KD group, PKR is a “semenanjung” (peninsular) party and what they wanted is a purely 
local-based opposition party to provide strong opposition voice in Sabah.  
 They regarded Anwar Ibrahim the de facto PKR leader as someone who was 
instrumental in toppling down the PBS Government in 1994. For them, Anwar is no more 
than a political opportunist and he used Jeffrey to expand his influence in Sabah.   
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The contents of the Tambunan Declaration may be appealing to some KD but 
they were not convinced that Sabah PKR was capable enough the pursue them. 
Moreover, the lackadaisical attitude shown by the PKR leadership to the Tambunan 
Declaration signals the fact that PKR is not ready to allow Sabahans to chart their own 
political future (Kanul Gindol 2008, pers. comm., June 25). Anwar and PKR president 
Wan Azizah Ismail did not show total commitment to the Declaration as they were afraid 
they are not able to exert control on Sabah if the PKR wins the elections (Kanul Gindol 
2008, pers. comm., June 25)6
                                               
6This claim, however, was denied by Jeffrey who said that the top PKR leadership had accepted and 
approved the Declaration (Daily Express, April 17, 2008). 
. Due to these reasons, grassroots KD felt that it would be 
pointless to vote for the opposition if it is not committed to fight for the state and KD 
rights.  
 
PBS, the KDCA and Huguan Siou Factor  
 
For some KD, they had no choice but to vote for the PBS, simply because they were no 
other alternative political parties in Sabah that could bring their voices to the mainstream 
political development. Since its inception in 1985, the PBS has been projecting its image 
as a strong KD-based party. In electoral terms, PBS’s survival is mainly contributed by 
the KD voters who give the party their consistent support in particular at the state level.  
 In 1985, for instance, of the 45 seats contested, PBS won 14 KD seats compared 
to USNO and BERJAYA, one seat each. The PBS only won one of 16 Muslim seats and 
five of seven Chinese seats. In 1986, the similar voting pattern occurred except that PBS 
managed to obtain more Chinese and Muslim seats.  
 In 1990, PBS repeated its success in winning all the 17  KD seats, seven  Chinese  
seats and four Muslim seats. In 1994, in what was regarded as a close fight between the 
then opposition PBS and BN, PBS only managed to scrape through with only 25 seats 
compared to BN 23. The PBS managed to retain all the 16 KD seats, lost three Chinese 
seats and retained the four Muslim seats. In an attempt to reduce the PBS’s power in KD 
majority seats, BN allowed the re-delineation of the electoral boundaries which enabled 
UMNO to gain the upper hand in Muslim areas.  
 In 1999, the PBS won ten KD seats, three Chinese seats and one Muslim seat. But 
PBS’s share of the popular votes (58 per cent) in KD areas indicated that it was still a 
preferred party among the KD compared to BN, 39 per cent.  In 2004, more Muslim 
majority areas were created and UMNO became a dominant party with 32 seats 
compared to 22 in 1999. This had reduced PBS’s influence in Muslim areas while at the 
same time re-affirmed its control in KD areas.     
 The fact that the opposition was not able to weaken the KD support of PBS 
indicated that Pairin’s role as Huguan Siou of the KD community played an important 
role even though others see the KD support as “automatic” and not attributed to the 
Huguan Siou title alone (Maximus Ongkili 2007, pers. comm., 30 October). The Huguan 
Siou title is purely cultural and serves as a symbol of unity to the KD community. The 
title had little bearing on the politics of the KD when Stephens was in power.  
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 But Pairin knew how important the title was to his position and that was why he 
tried to institutionalise it by vesting power to the KDCA to bestow the Huguan Siou title. 
The KDCA also happened to be led by Pairin who acted as president. Significantly, the 
KDCA took the drastic way to include all the 40 major ethnic groups in Sabah into one 
ethnic label known as “KD” so as increase the numerical strengths of the KD people 
(Daily Express, January 14, 1989).   
 It would appear that Pairin’s position as Huguan Siou would outlast his position 
as PBS president and that no one else could replace him because the Huguan Siou title 
was given to Pairin for his struggles, personality and characters (Yong Teck Lee 2007, 
pers. comm., 28 June). This puts Pairin is a unique position as there are no political 
leaders in Malaysia who hold an influential traditional title and lead a cultural body like 
him.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As we have seen from the analysis above, there are three main factors which explain why 
the KD voters voted for the BN and why they had abandoned the opposition: 
Lack of strong issues propounded by opposition local-based parties:  generally the 
KD voters are parochial and that they prefer a local party to represent them. The KD had 
no choice but to back PBS and UPKO as they are the only prominent local parties that 
have played the role as the eyes and ears for the KD community. Other local parties such 
as BERSEKUTU and PASOK are generally ineffective as they lack influential leaders 
and weak party structure. The lack of local issues and the unsystematic manners through 
which they were being disseminated by local opposition parties might also turn away KD 
voters.   
Non-committal attitude shown by the opposition: even though the opposition led by 
PKR promised to return state rights back to Sabahans, the voters were not convinced of 
its sincerity. First, they saw the PKR as just another “parti semenanjung” (peninsular 
party) wanting to control the political fortune of the KD people. Anwar, for example, was 
seen as a former UMNO leader who was instrumental in toppling down the PBS 
government in 1994 while Jeffrey was seen as no more than a political opportunist 
wanting to make a political comeback7
Lack of strong opposition pact: the opposition’s failure to form a formidable force also 
contributed to the BN’s victory (Welsh 2008a and The Star, March 10, 2008). From the 
analysis, the opposition would have denied BN a huge majority in a number of KD areas 
and would have won at least one seat in Bingkor. Even though it would be impossible for 
the opposition in the form of PKR-DAP-PAS alliance to form a government in Sabah, at 
.  
The failure of the Tambunan Declaration was contributed by the non-committal 
attitude shown by PKR leadership which is more likely to impose a direct federal control 
rather than surrendering certain autonomy to Sabah (Kanul Gindol 2008, pers. comm., 
June 25). Certainly for the KD voters, they had nothing to lose in re-electing the BN as 
they saw the party as being capable of bringing much development to the state. The 
message of development that the BN was conveying seemed attractive to some, coupled 
with the old tactic of giving on-the-spot grants.  
                                               
7 Based on a random interview conducted by the authors and the readers’ feedback published in major local 
newspapers.  
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least, they could deny the BN a major victory had they chosen not to contest against each 
other in certain “opposition-prone” areas. Just before polling, their “marriage of 
convenience” had turned sour as a result of their squabble over seat allocation. Anwar’s 
presence to ease the tension and to broker a deal proved to be futile when the issue 
remained unresolved until polling day (The Borneo Post, February 26, 2008).  
Role of PBS, the KDCA and Huguan Siou institution: since joining the BN in 2002, 
the PBS has ensured that the coalition party has the strong support of the KD people. This 
is because the KD support of PBS is significantly tied to Pairin’s dual role as Huguan 
Siou and president of the influential KDCA. The KD see no other political parties as 
capable of bringing their voices to the mainstream political development. Even though 
Jeffrey tried to assume the role through PKR, he failed because PKR is not a local party 
that understands the struggles of the KD people.     
 Another KD party which strongly uses the ethnic KD sentiment is UPKO. But 
unlike PBS, UPKO’s grassroots support is marginally weaker. But it is possible for 
UPKO to take over from PBS as it is seriously now launching an aggressive campaign to 
recruit more KD members, the latest being the launching of Komulakan (junior youth 
wing). Another KD based party PBRS exists because of Joseph Kurup, who is battling to 
survive politically. In the electoral term, the PBRS remains a “mosquito party” and its 
appeal among the KD is generally lower.  
 The PBS is still a force to be reckoned with in BN for its contribution in giving 
the coalition party’s the KD votes is quite significant vis-à-vis other state BN KD parties. 
The KD in turn consistently give their votes to PBS simply because of Pairin’s role as 
Huguan Siou and president of the influential KDCA. The KD see no other state KD 
parties that could replace the PBS just yet and their support of the party will remain 
strong in the years to come. The UPKO is slowly making inroads and its strong KD 
appeal has attracted the young and professional KD. Having said all this, the opposition 
presence in KD areas cannot be underestimated because some KD have begun to look 
beyond PBS in the post Mahathir era.    
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